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A number of authors have combined a commitment to Darwinian
evolution as a major source of insight into human nature with a
strong commitment to environmentalist concerns. The most
notable of these is perhaps Edward O. Wilson, in a series of books.1
Yet it may appear that there is a tension between Darwinism as a
world-view – or least some major aspects of it – and a concern for
non-human entities as worthy of concern in their own right. In the
present paper, I want to address some of the reasons for thinking
there is such a tension.
Firstly, it might be thought that Darwin has taught us that the
relationship between different species is intrinsically antagonistic,
and moreover that this antagonism is what drives evolutionary
change itself. Thanks to the popular iconography associated with
Darwinism, we tend to think of the process of evolution as being
primarily natural selection, and of natural selection as a ‘struggle’
or ‘competition’ between creatures, where one creature’s gain is inevi-
tably another’s loss. Moreover, we tend to think of different species,
not just individuals of the same species, as in struggle or competition
against each other. The popular iconography often portrays this
struggle as incessant, so that the day-to-day life of creatures is seen
as one of ‘kill or be killed’, ‘eat or be eaten’. This would not in
itself show that we should not be concerned about non-human enti-
ties, at least not without committing the fallacy of ‘is’ implies ‘ought’.
Nor would it even show that it is impossible for us to be so concerned.
But it would suggest that, in being so concerned we would be
somehow sailing against the wind of evolution, either against the
process itself, or against inbuilt tendencies that it has produced in
ourselves, or both. Consequently, if we wanted a basis for our envir-
onmentalist concerns, we would have to find it somewhere other than
in evolution. In this paper, I will attempt to show that this view of
evolution is highly misleading, and at best gives us only a very
partial picture.
1 See for example Edward O. Wilson: The Future of Life (London:
Abacus, 2002); Brian Baxter: A Darwinian Worldview: Sociobiology,
Environmental Ethics and the Work of Edward O. Wilson (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2007).
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But that, by itself, will not tell us anything about whether, or to
what extent, we should care about the non-human environment. As
regards this issue, there are two basic positions: (1) Deep ecology is
the view that non-human entities – such as animals, trees, and
even, in more extreme versions, inanimate objects such as hills or
islands – have moral standing in themselves.2 That is, they are entitled
to certain types of treatment, or we have certain duties towards them,
irrespective of any benefits that they confer on us humans. That is not
to say that the moral standing of these non-human entities overrides
that of humans. In deciding what to do, there may, consistently
with deep ecology, be a trade-off between benefit to humans and
benefit to other things. The key point is that the moral standing of
non-human entities is not derived from that of humans: it is not
just because they benefit us that they deserve ourmoral consideration.
(2) The opposing view to this is instrumentalism as regards the non-
human environment: the view that we only have obligations to any
non-human entity insofar as it affects us, and that those obligations
are entirely dependent upon and derived from our obligations to
humans. My aim in this paper is not to defend deep ecology, or
indeed to settle the issue between deep ecology and instrumentalism
oneway or another. Rather, I am attempting to show that what counts
as being of instrumental value to humans is rather more than may
sometimes be thought. That is, even if we accept the arguments for
instrumentalism, we still ought to have a great deal of concern for pre-
serving the environment. The difference between deep ecology and
instrumentalism in practice may be very little. At the very end of
the paper, I will also (tentatively) suggest that a purely instrumental
attitude to the environment is not really possible. So I suggest a
position somewhere between deep ecology and instrumentalism.
Someone who argues for an instrumentalist position on scientific,
and specifically evolutionary, grounds, is Richard Lewontin.
According to Lewontin, the idea that we should save the environ-
ment, or even that there is an environment independent of us for us
to be concerned about, is fundamentally misguided. This is
because he thinks there is no such thing as the environment: there
are only the environments of different types of creatures, which are
partially but inextricably constituted by the activities of those crea-
tures and which we, like any other living thing, cannot help but
alter to suit ourselves. If this is so, he argues, then the idea that any
2 See Arne Næss: Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an




non-human entity has moral standing independent of our interests
makes no sense. Thus, Lewontin concludes, any programme of con-
servation must perforce be subservient to human interests. I wish to
address Lewontin’s arguments here.
1. The image of evolution as ruthless competition
What implications does Darwinism have for our attitude towards the
environment? At first sight, it might look as thoughDarwinism is not
friendly towards environmental concerns. Darwinism is often
thought to paint a picture of ruthless competition between, as well
as within, species. This, in turn, may be thought to encourage a
view of the environment as something to be exploited for self-inter-
ested gain. Darwin himself did not use the expression ‘survival of the
fittest’ until the fifth edition of The Origin of Species. But he did use
the expressions ‘preservation of favoured races’ (as part of the full title
of The Origin of Species) and ‘struggle for existence’ (the title of
Chapter 3). What is beyond doubt is that the association between
on the one hand the terms ‘Darwinism’, ‘natural selection’ and
even ‘evolution’ itself, and on the other the image of ruthless compe-
tition between organisms, is powerful and deeply ingrained, in the
minds both of the general public and of many scientists. Indeed,
the dissemination of Darwin’s theory, and of its present-day
updated and corrected version (though there is some disagreement
as to exactly what that is), often strongly reinforces that association.
I am not about to embark on a lengthy spree of Dawkins-bashing,
and I will later argue that some of Dawkins’ supposedly more soph-
isticated opponents are equally guilty of distortions. But it must be
admitted that the until-recently Professor for the Public
Understanding of Science has been culpable in this regard. In his
TV programmes The Root of All Evil? and The Genius of Charles
Darwin, Dawkins introduces the concept of natural selection to the
accompaniment of images of a cheetah chasing down and killing an
antelope, a spider devouring a fly, and so forth. The voice-over,
meanwhile, informs us that natural selection is a process in which
the general law is eat or be eaten, kill or be killed:
As night falls, it’s kill or be killed.…During the minute it takes
me to say these words, thousands of animals are running for their
lives whimpering with fear, feeling teeth sink into their throats,
thousands are dying from starvation or disease, or feeling a para-
site rasping away from within. There is no central authority, no
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safety net. For most animals the reality of life is struggling, suf-
fering, and death.3
Dawkins often describes nature itself as ‘ruthless’, ‘pitiless’ and so
forth, and he is not alone in this. One thing that might be – and has
been – said about this type of language is that it is unduly anthropo-
morphic. An impersonal natural process cannot be ruthless or piti-
less, because it is not the kind of thing that can show mercy (ruth)
or pity at all. We might as well say that the process is immoral or
has bad taste, as opposed to being something to which the concepts
of morality and taste just do not apply. Some people worry about
this anthropomorphic language more than I do.4 We use metaphors
all the time, and this does not seem to me to be in itself problematic,
even in science, as long as we know how to cash the metaphors out in
literal terms. And in this instance, the literal meaning of what
Dawkins is saying seems clear enough: other metaphors for the
same thing include: it is a zero-sum game, one creature’s gain is an-
other’s loss, etc. Essentially, Dawkins is saying that, as a general
rule, when one creature’s chances of surviving and reproducing are
increased, it is by means of another creature’s chances of surviving
and reproducing being decreased.
Prior to giving a response, I would like to suggest that there are two
different things that Dawkins might be saying. Firstly, he might be
talking about the products of evolution; that is, he might be saying
that what evolution produces, as a general rule, is creatures that are
constantly engaged in zero-sum games against each other. Or, sec-
ondly, he might be talking about the process of evolution; that is, he
might be saying that evolutionary change is predominantly produced
by the accumulation of zero-sum games. (This is of course assuming
that he takes natural selection to be the predominant producer of evol-
utionary change, but he clearly does, and has said so on many
occasions.5) At times, it looks as though Dawkins is only making
the second claim. In The Selfish Gene,6 he goes to great lengths to
explain that natural selection, though in itself ‘ruthless’ and ‘pitiless’,
3 ‘The Genius of Charles Darwin’, Channel 4, November 2008.
4 For Example Mary Midgley ‘Gene-Juggling’ Philosophy, vol. 54
(1979) 439–58; Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan: Acquiring Genomes: A
Theory of the Origins of Species (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
5 For Example Dawkins: ‘Universal Darwinism’ in D.S. Bendall, ed.
Evolution from Molecules to Man (Cambridge University Press). Reprinted
in Hull and Ruse, ed, The Philosophy of Biology (Oxford University Press,
1998).
6 Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 1989).
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can and often does produce behavioural tendencies that are co-oper-
ative (reciprocally beneficial) or altruistic (self-sacrificing for the
benefit of others). However, the behavioural tendencies of which he
speaks are always between members of the same species: an individual
may co-operate with another individual of the same species for reci-
procal benefit; an individual may sacrifice itself for the benefit of
another of the same species. So it is not clear whether he thinks co-
operation or altruism between members of different species are poss-
ible, or at all common, outcomes of evolution. It may be, for all he
tells us, that they are only very rare, aberrant, outcomes. The
general rule for how creatures fashioned by evolution behave
towards each other is: eat or be eaten, kill or be killed.
Now, straight away, and without having to reach for exotic, unfa-
miliar examples, it can be said that this is at best an extremely
partial picture of what goes on between organisms of different
species in the natural world. Only some animals are carnivores. If
he intended to illustrate a perfectly typical product of evolution,
Dawkins could have shown us an image of a monkey eating a
banana. Not only does the monkey not kill the banana tree by
eating the banana; the banana being eaten is in fact the means by
which the banana tree produces offspring in thewild.More generally,
herbivorous animals very often play this vital role for the plants they
feed on – seed distribution. An extremely common pattern is that the
seeds are passed out in the faeces of the animal, and the faeces provide
a nutrition-rich base from which a new plant can grow. So the animal
gets a meal, the plant gets a chance to reproduce – it is reciprocal
benefit, not zero-sum. The same is true of bees pollinating plants.
It could be added that even carnivorous animals cannot wipe out
the animals on which they prey.
But there is a deeper story here, one that has begun to be revealed in
the work of Lynn Margulis and others. Margulis became famous for
her hypothesis about the origins of the eukaryotic cell, a hypothesis
that is now generally accepted, and about which I will say more
anon. Margulis argues that mutually beneficial relationships
between creatures of different species are in fact all-pervasive, and
that what we often think of as a single organism is usually a collection
of organisms of different kinds.7 The most obvious example of this is
lichens, which consist of algae and fungi (and often bacteria as well)
living in symbiosis. The algal component and the fungal component
can in fact live separately, but when they are together, as is the norm,
7 Lynn Margulis: Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution
(New York: Basic Books, 1998).
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they share functions rather than duplicating them. But examples of
such symbiotic relationships can be found much closer to home,
and much more pervasively. Moreover, they are often found to
involve much deeper integration than in the lichen case: it is precisely
because the two components are not all that deeply integrated that the
dual nature of lichens was discovered so relatively early. Cows are re-
nowned for their possession of multiple ‘stomachs’, and for the
process of pre-digestion that one ‘stomach’ (more properly called
the rumen) performs before the cow chews it again and it then food
enters the stomach proper. But this process of preparing the cow’s
food for digestion is carried on in the rumen by a vast array of
micro-organisms. The rumen provides a nutrition-rich environment
for the micro-organisms, and they in turn play a vital role in enabling
the cow to digest. Bacteria in our own intestines perform analogous
functions for us, and Margulis estimates that about 10% of our
bodies by dry weight consists of such friendly bacteria. A more dra-
matic example can be found in termites. Up to 30% of their bodymass
is made up of bacteria which enable to them to digest wood. Within
cells themselves, a similar situation can be found. What we might
think of as a single cell often contains component parts that have
their own separate DNA, thus being in that sense separate organisms.
But they are tightly integrated with their hosts in situations of reci-
procal benefit. Margulis has argued that the flagella of many bacterial
cells may have evolved from separate entities (although this hypoth-
esis is not widely accepted). So, while predation and parasitism do
exist – situations in which one creature’s gain is another’s loss –
there is no reason to think it is the norm of what evolution produces.
But what about the process of evolution? Recall that Dawkins be-
lieves that natural selection is the prime producer of evolutionary
change. He is by no means alone in this. Darwin himself wrote that
‘I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but not ex-
clusive means of modification.’8 To be fair to Darwin, however, even
he makes clear, in the chapter with this title, that the term ‘struggle
for existence’ not only should not be taken as implying any intention
on an organism’s part, but also should not be taken as entailing that
one creature only gains out of another’s loss. He says, for example,
that a plant on its own at the edge of a desert may be said to be strug-
gling for existence – even though the only things that threaten it are
the inanimate physical conditions around it:
8 Darwin, Charles (1859): The Origin of Species. Reprint of the First
Edition, W.J. Burrow, ed. (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1968), 69.
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Two canine animals in a time of dearth, may be truly said to
struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a
plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle against the
drought, thoughmore properly it should be said to be dependent
on the moisture.9
Admittedly, this must be set against his remark about natural selec-
tion being the primary driving force, for selection is between crea-
tures and other creatures, not between creatures and their inanimate
surroundings. However, our knowledge of evolution has grown
since Darwin’s time. Think again about the herbivores and the
plants they feed off. How did these arrangements come about in
the first place? In many cases, the fruit, and the herbivore’s ingestive
and digestive apparatus are evolved to fit each other. The herbivores
did not find the fruit ready-made in its current form – they co-
evolved. Likewise with bees and flowers. There is an (unintention-
ally) amusing video, easy to find on YouTube, made by two ‘creation
scientists’, Kirk Cameron and Ray Comfort, entitled ‘The Banana –
The Atheist’s Worst Nightmare’. The presenters point out in great
detail how extremely well designed bananas are for being eaten by
humans. But there is nothing whatsoever paradoxical about this. If
we assume that our ancestors have been eating bananas for a long
time – which seems extremely likely, given that both humans and
our nearest relatives chimpanzees are very fond of bananas – then
we have been co-evolving with bananas for a very long time. Of
course they are well-designed for being eaten by us! (Given that
human hands, mouths, and digestive organs are suited to a very
wide variety of different tasks and food-types, it is likely that it was
bananas that did most of the adapting to us or our distant ancestors,
rather than the other way round.We have also been selectively breed-
ing them for many centuries now, to make them easier for us to eat.)
But once again, such cases of obvious co-evolution are just the tip
of a huge iceberg. Margulis has a radical new view on how evolution-
ary novelties, and in particular new species, arise.10 Consider again
those micro-organisms that live inside the bodies of termites, cows,
and us. Note that in every case the micro-organisms perform func-
tions that are useful, and in many instances indispensible, to the
hosts. But at some point in the past the ancestors of the micro-organ-
isms must have entered the ancestors of the hosts, and hence before
that they must have been able to live separately. So when the
9 Ibid., 116.
10 Margulis: Acquiring Genomes.
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micro-organisms entered the hosts it must have triggered a process of
co-evolution, a process by which both parties gained.
The importance of such processes of symbiosis-followed-by-coe-
volution for bringing about major evolutionary change can be seen
most strikingly in the origin of eukaryotic cells. Eukaryotic cells are
cells that contain a nucleus containing DNA, and other organelles –
e.g. mitochondria, chloroplasts – which contain their own separate
DNA. The cells of all animals, fungi and plants are eukaryotic. We
tend to think of the DNA in the nucleus as ‘the’ genes of an individ-
ual. And it is true that a lot of genetic research has focussed on the
DNA that gets recombined in sexual reproduction. We are familiar,
for example, with the fact that if your father carries some rare reces-
sive gene (e.g. the cystic fibrosis gene) then the chances that you also
carry it are 50%. But that is because your nuclear DNA is inherited
from your mother and your father. By contrast, the DNA in your
mitochondria is inherited only from your mother. So if your
mother carries some rare mitochondrial-DNA gene, then – barring
mutations – the chances of you also carrying it are 100%. Margulis’
hypothesis, now generally accepted, was that these organelles carry
their own separate DNA because they were once separate organ-
isms.11 The transition from bacteria to eukaryotic cells involved the
coming together into mutual beneficial symbioses of different types
of cells, and that relationship became progressively more tightly inte-
grated. The ancestors of (e.g.) our mitochondria entered into a sym-
biotic relationship with other cells, and have since co-evolved with
them. Thus, the great increase of cellular complexity that made poss-
ible the existence of all plants, fungi and animals happened because
cells of different kinds formed symbiotic relationships – co-operative
partnerships, if youwill – and then co-evolved to be tightly integrated
units functioning as one.
I offer one final, (literally) colourful example: green animals. As
you may remember from your high school biology, green plant
cells have chloroplasts but animal cells don’t, and it is by means of
chloroplasts that plants photosynthesise. Chloroplasts, like mito-
chondria, have their ownDNA, and so are almost certainly descended
from what were once separate organisms. The simpler varieties of
green algae are in fact quite similar to chloroplasts, except that the
latter don’t perform all their life-sustaining functions for themselves,
instead relying on other parts of the cells they are in to do so. So in all
likelihood ancestral proto-plants assimilated green algae in someway.




This implies that green plants did not themselves evolve the ability to
photosynthesise: rather, they incorporated organisms that had
already evolved it. What is less well known is that there are also
some animals that contain chloroplasts, and are in consequence
green and able to photosynthesise. For example, green slugs such as
Elysia viridis can go without food for as long as nine months;
instead of eating they bask in the sun in shallow waters. They
ingest green algae, but do not digest them; instead they incorporate
them into their tissues where they remain alive and active. This,
too, must result from co-evolution between the algae and the slugs.
Even if one is sceptical about Margulis’ more all-embracing claim
about symbiosis being the driving force of evolution, there is no
doubt that it has been responsible for some of the most important
transitions. So there is no reason to think of the process of evolution-
ary change as essentially involving zero-sum games, or kill-or-be-
killed. It is just as likely to be brought about by the setting up of
situations of reciprocal benefit between organisms of different
species. Likewise as regards evolution’s products: evolution does not
invariably produce creatures whose interests are antagonistic to each
other. It also produces creatures, very often of different species, who
work together for reciprocal benefit. Consequently, there is nothing
intrinsically anti-evolutionary in working to help other species. The
fact that we have evolved does not imply that we have an inbuilt ten-
dency to be antagonistic towards other living things.
2. Lewontin and the challenge to Deep Ecology
A second challenge to environmentalism from evolutionary theory
comes from someone who has been one of Dawkins’ severest critics
over the last thirty years and more: Richard Lewontin. While
Dawkins sees the relationship between different species as intrinsi-
cally antagonistic, and such antagonism as essential to evolutionary
change, Lewontin claims that the environment does not exist. He
says that ‘the growing environmentalist movement to prevent altera-
tions in the natural world that will be, at best, unpleasant and, at
worst, catastrophic for human existence cannot proceed rationally
under the false slogan “Save the Environment”. The environment
does not exist to be saved.’12 Rather, he thinks, ‘what we can do is
12 Richard Lewontin: The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism and




try to affect the rate of extinction and direction of environmental
change in such a way as to make a decent life for human beings poss-
ible.’13 In other words, we can nurture, preserve, and shape theworld
in a way that best serves human interests.
Such a view flies in the face of deep ecology – the view that non-
human entities have moral standing in themselves. Lewontin’s view
of our obligations towards the non-humanworld is an instrumentalist
one, as the above quotations make clear.
How does Lewontin argue for this view? The key point he is
arguing is that there is no such thing as the environment tout court.
That is, what counts as constituting the environment depends on
the type of creature you are, and hence different types of creature,
even in the same physical place, will have different environments.
We should not think of the world as containing pre-existing niches
into which creatures come and adapt themselves. As Lewontin some-
times likes to express it, a world without living things would contain
no niches, no environments. This breaks down into two points:
(1) Niche construction: Any living creature, simply by existing,
will physically alter its immediate surroundings.
(2) Biological Kantianism: Not everything in the physical sur-
roundings of an organism is relevant to it at all, and the
same thing in the same physical surroundingsmay have differ-
ent relevance to different organisms.
(1) Niche construction: The first point is most obviously true if we
consider cases such as the following. Trees create a canopy that
changes the temperature, humidity and lighting conditions beneath
it in a dramatic way. Termites build vast (nine metres high in some
cases) mounds, thus providing for themselves a mini-world whose
temperature, humidity and lighting are highly regulated and signifi-
cantly different from what they are outside. Beavers build dams that
alter the flow of rivers. But Lewontin’s argument does not depend on
the recitation of individual examples. His point is that any living crea-
ture is constantly taking in matter from its surroundings and giving
out matter to its surroundings. It cannot but alter them. Similarly,
every living creature gives off or takes in heat, so that the temperature
of the zone immediately around its body is something other than it
would be were the creature not there. For example, we humans
carry around with us an envelope of air that is constantly regulated
by the heat of our own bodies: it is the temperature of this air that




that our air-envelope is usually warmer than the air would be if we
weren’t there. This explains whywindmakes us feel cold – it momen-
tarily deprives us of our warm envelope. There can, then, be no talk of
us, or any other organism, leaving the environment unaffected.
Simply by being alive in it, we are altering it.
Moreover, it is this altered environment – altered, that is, by the
creature’s own presence within it – to which any creature is
adapted. It is common to think of the environment as something
that exists prior to a given creature living in it, and of the creature
as becoming adapted to that environment. It is true that evolution
happens because the morphologies of organisms are malleable, and
are changed in response changes to the physical surroundings. But
what Lewontin wants to emphasise is that the physical surroundings
are also malleable, and any living creature perforce changes them just
by living in them. Living creatures in general are, as a result of evol-
ution, well-suited to the physical surroundings they live in. But that is
not just because they have altered themselves, or been altered, to
accommodate to living in those surroundings: it is also because
they have themselves altered the surroundings. In some cases (e.g.
the termites) they have altered them to produce a niche that suits
their needs; in others, they have produced effects as an inevitable con-
sequence of their activities. But in either type of case, the world to
which they are suited to live in is not one that existed prior to
them. The ambient temperature in which humans feel comfortable
is the one produced by our own bodies. And termites doubtless
have evolved functions that their ancestors didn’t have before they
lived in mounds, and lost ones they had. The consequence of all
this, then, is that the world we humans live in is a world that we
have made. This is true not just of the obvious technology that we
have made, but of the grass and the very air that surrounds us. And
it is a world to which we are suited. There can be no talk of us
making a world that is free of our alterations, and in any event such
a world would be impossible for us to live in.
(2) Biological Kantianism: But Lewontin’s second point is more
radical. He argues that not only do creatures inevitably alter their
physical surroundings, but that the physical surroundings do not in
themselves constitute the creature’s environment. To begin with,
we can take the environment to mean that to which a creature is
adapted, or which poses a problem to which it needs to adapt. If we
do so, then two different types of creature (e.g. different species)
living in the same physical surroundings – even taking into account
the changes that they both have made to those surroundings – will,
according to Lewontin, be in different environments. The reason
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for this is that the entities around them will have different signifi-
cances for one than for the other. ‘Significance’ here just means
‘the difference something makes’. But the difference something
makes to any creature will vary depending on the type of creature it
is. For example, a piece of woodland may contain a plant that is a nu-
tritious food for one creature, a deadly poison to another. So,
although one and the same plant is in the two creatures’ physical sur-
roundings, different things are in their respective environments.
Different challenges or opportunities are presented to different crea-
tures by the same plant. Similarly, objects in the physical surround-
ings may have importance for one creature, but none for another.
Lewontin gives the example of a water boatman, a long-legged
insect that lives on the surface of ponds. For this creature, the
surface tension of water is a significant feature of the environment,
something that it is obliged to cope with in a way that we humans
are not. Moreover, for a smaller creature that dwells on the surface
of water, such as the microscopic paramecium, surface tension is a
more significant feature of the environment than gravity. Lewontin
also mentions the thrushes and phoebes in his garden. Thrushes
use small stones to break open snails’ shells, but for a phoebe the
stones might as well not be there. For one creature, a particular
object in its surroundings is of supreme importance. For another,
the same object does not exist; it is no part of its environment at all.
A consequence of this view is that a creature can never have direct
access to all the things that are in its physical surroundings. It has
access to things that are of relevance to it – as dangers, opportunities,
obstacles – insofar as they are of relevance to it. Moreover, there is no
reason to think that humans are a special case: we are, it is true, excep-
tionally hungry for information – i.e. we gather information well
beyond immediate or even possible utility. But we do so using
sense organs and cognitive apparatus that have been shaped
through and through by past evolution. There is no reason to think
that every bit of our physical surroundings is accessible to or under-
standable by us, even with all the prosthetics in the world.
Ultimately, we can be aware only of what affects us. Affecting us
may only mean exciting our curiosity, but our curiosity is a feature
of minds shaped by past evolution.14
14 For an elaboration of this consequence of Lewontin’s view, see
Matthew Ratcliffe: ‘An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary




Hence, on Lewontin’s view, we can only be concerned for the
environment insofar as it affects humans, which would be bad news
for any deeper ecological views. However, Lewontin’s point can be
turned around: not only is the environment partially constituted by
the organism; the organism is partially constituted by its environ-
ment. This implies, or so I will argue, that in damaging its environ-
ment an organism is damaging itself. In fact, Lewontin’s arguments,
far from negating this point, actually reinforce it. As some of the
examples already mentioned illustrate, creatures shape their sur-
roundings and in turn are shaped by their surroundings. In fact, it
is a little misleading to say ‘and in turn’ since it is an ongoing, cyclical
process of reciprocal effects. We make our niches (but, it should be
emphasised, not out of nothing) and we ourselves change to fit into
those niches. Similarly, if we take Lewontin’s biological Kantian
point, it too cuts both ways. This is not just because organisms
adapt to their environment, but because the development of an or-
ganism requires a particular type of environment to go smoothly,
or indeed at all. This is part and parcel of the wisdom of developmen-
tal biology. It is generally admitted that genes play a key role in
shaping the development of any organism, but they do not shape it
on their own. Any developing organism depends on resources from
its surroundings to develop. If those resources are not there, or are
different, the organism will fail to develop normally, or at all. So
just as there is no environment without an organism, neither is
there any organism without an environment. An organisms’ environ-
ment – delicate as it is, and partially made and constituted by the or-
ganism as it is – is part of the organism.
This point can be taken further by drawing on something else that
Darwin taught us. All of earthly life is one family. We all, from bac-
teria and archaea to petunias, platypuses and people, are descended
from one common ancestor. In fact, a host of discoveries in different
areas of biology have revealed that the kinship goes far deeper than
Darwin suspected. The unravelling of the genomes of different crea-
tures has revealed that there is far less genetic variety than we might
have thought. For example, the genes involved in building eyes in
fruit-flies are the same as those involved in building human eyes.
Moreover, recent work in evolutionary developmental biology has re-
vealed previously unsuspected deep structural similarities across a
wide spectrum of living things: widely different species can be
thought of as combinations of the same basic kit. And the work
that Margulis pioneered reveals that the very cells in our bodies, as
well as those of other animals, fungi and plants, contain the descen-
dants of what were once separate living creatures, with most of
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their genotypes still intact. We once thought of evolution as a diver-
ging tree of life, but, because many major evolutionary changes were
produced by organisms assimilating other organisms in symbiotic
relationships, it might be better to think of it as a web whose
strands converge as well as diverge. If we trace our ancestry via our
nuclear DNA alone, then we are descended from single-celled organ-
isms called archaea. These archaea were ultimately descended from
bacteria. But the bacteria that were the ancestors of our mitochondria
diverged from the archaea before they joined up with archaea to form
the closely co-operating collectives we call eukaryotic cells. We are
clearly descended from archaea, but should we say that we are des-
cended from our mitochondria’s free-living predecessors as well?
Or should we just say that our mitochondria themselves are? Our
mitochondria are part of us in a very strong sense, a stronger sense,
for example, than the symbiont micro-organisms that live in our
digestive systems. We could stipulate that only our nuclear DNA
counts as far as ancestry goes, so we are descended from archaea
and not from our mitochondria’s free-living ancestors. But the
motivation for doing it does not seem very strong. In just what
sense are we our cell nuclei but not our mitochondria? Noam
Chomsky once remarked that if alien linguists landed on Earth,
they might think that all human languages were one language. In a
similar vein, I suggest that if alien geneticists landed on Earth, they
might be impressed by the genetic similarity between all its living
creatures: might they think that we were all one kind?
The overall picture that emerges is of an environment which has
shaped, and been shaped by, terrestrial life as a whole. A view of
the natural world as in a strong sense ‘ours’, where this means belong-
ing to life as a whole, makes good sense in the light of evolution.What
I suggest is that we should learn to look on the Earth as our home in a
very deep sense: it is the homewe – all living creatures – havemade for
ourselves, and to which we have become adapted. Think of armchair
into which indentations have been formed by our sitting in it over
many years. It has been, entirely unconsciously, shaped by us to
suit us. But now imagine that a whole host of things in our surround-
ings have been so shaped, and that we have in turn been shaped by
them, so that they fit us and we fit them. Our ‘environment’, I
want to suggest, is like this. What we think of as the ‘natural’ environ-
ment is in fact a collection of things in our surroundings that we have
shaped and to suit us. We can make this point at bigger or smaller
magnitudes. It has been suggested that the movement of the
Earth’s tectonic plates is a result of the action of living organisms at
the thermal vents at the bottom of the sea, so that the distribution
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of the continents is due to living things. And it is not even controver-
sial that all the free oxygen in the Earth’s atmosphere is there because
of green plants and algae. The blue-green ball with whose appearance
from outer space we are all familiar would look very different if living
things had not been acting on it for billions of years. If we are willing
to think of all of life as ‘us’, then we should look at that blue-green ball
and say: that is our home, whichwemade. If we are not prepared to go
that far, we can focus our attention more narrowly, and think about
the world that is our – that is, humans’ – home. Our ancestors
evolved in African savannah, and the niche that we adapted to and
ourselves shaped contains the familiar ‘natural’ features grass,
running water, trees, and so forth. This was the home that we made
for ourselves and adapted ourselves to long before we built stone
houses. Edward O. Wilson has frequently pointed out that people
are happier in a world that has grass, running water etc. We should
not think of such a world as ‘natural’, if natural means in contrast
to a human world. It is the human world, far more than the world
of technological ‘conveniences’. We tamper with it at our peril. I
will let Wilson speak here:
It is … possible for some to dream that people will go on living
comfortably in a biologically impoverished world. They
suppose that a prosthetic environment is within the power of
technology, that human life can still flourish in a completely hu-
manized world, where medicines would all be synthesized from
chemicals off the shelf, food grown from a few domestic crop
species, the atmosphere and climate regulated by computer-
driven fusion energy, and the earth made over until it becomes
a literal spaceship rather than a metaphorical one, with people
reading displays and touching buttons on the bridge.15
But he warns against such a view:
To disregard the diversity of life is to risk catapulting ourselves
into an alien environment. We will have become like the pilot
whales that inexplicably beach themselves on New England
shores.16
Wilson defends this view in part by appealing to the potential ob-
viously instrumental uses to which things in the environment can
be put. E.g. by driving species to extinction, we might inadvertently





lose a chance of discovering cures for all kinds of illnesses. But I
would like to think that he is saying more than this here: he is
saying that a world with significantly reduced species diversity
world would be a world in which human life would be greatly impo-
verished – would be an inhuman world. And let us not forget that a
world with significantly reduced biological diversity is something
that we are currently in serious danger of creating.
I tentatively suggest, then, a position somewhere in between the
deep ecology and instrumentalist positions. A purely instrumentalist
attitude towards the non-human world, I claim, makes no sense. The
environment is part of us, as much as our arms and legs are, and we
can no more take a purely instrumentalist attitude towards the
environment than we can towards ourselves. But the deep ecology ap-
proach presupposes that the non-human environment can have a
good that is independent of our good. On an optimistic view, there
need be no conflict between an instrumentalist attitude towards the
environment and a deep ecology one, once they have both beenmodi-
fied to take into account how evolution actually works, and how or-
ganisms, including us, relate to their/our environment.
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